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FitzSimonds: Technological Change and the Future of Warfare,

developed today is certainly not optimal,
would Cambone’s system be better?
Despite his failure to consider the second
and third-order effects of enacting the
system he proposes, Cambone provides
the basis for a great academic discussion
over future national security policy and
how it is developed. It is a topic that needs
to be discussed, and as the author has
emphatically pointed out, the time is
now. This point is hard to refute. As the
world’s sole remaining superpower, and
as the debate and divergence over how
policy gets developed becomes stronger,
the United States must reflect on how to
improve its national security decision
making structure.
In sum, Cambone and his colleagues
have provided a good point of departure
for a debate on how the United States
should develop and implement future
national security policy. There are many
things to consider, and this book will get
us started.
CHARLES NEIMEYER

Naval War College

O’Hanlon, Michael. Technological Change and the
Future of Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 208pp. $42.95

Over the past several years, the U.S. military has officially embraced the idea
that rapidly evolving technologies soon
will lead to a profound change in the
conduct of warfare. The need to innovate in response to a prospective revolution in military affairs is the central
theme of Joint Vision 2010 and similar
force-planning documents. Some studies, such as the congressionally mandated National Defense Panel, have
concluded that only immediate and
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radical transformation to new systems,
new operational concepts, and new organizations will enable the U.S. military
to retain its battlefield dominance.
Michael O’Hanlon, however, is not convinced. In his view, most calls for transformation lack any systematic or rigorous
analysis of how emerging technologies
might specifically change the character of
combat in the coming decades. Thus the
goal of this book is to provide realistic
projections of technological possibilities
that offer a better idea of how the U.S.
military might best proceed in future research and acquisition.
O’Hanlon examines a wide range of
militarily relevant technologies, in two
broad categories: those primarily electronic (sensors, computers, and communications), and those primarily mechanical
(vehicles, ships, aircraft, and weapons).
From this survey he offers an evaluation
of where evolving technologies are likely
to provide new capabilities over the next
two decades, and where significant force
limitations are likely to remain.
In the realm of electronics, O’Hanlon
expects continued advances in computers
and communications but foresees no imminent breakthrough in sensors that will
significantly improve one’s ability to detect and track the adversary’s activity. He
specifically rejects the idea that the battlefield can be rendered “transparent.”
On the mechanical side, he sees no
near-term developments that will allow
maneuver and strike forces to become
sufficiently light, fast, fuel efficient, or
stealthy to allow profound improvements
in speed of movement or lethality. Thus
he concludes that proponents of transformation provide neither a compelling
case for a near-term revolution in warfare
nor any adequate idea of what the military should be transforming itself into.
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O’Hanlon’s general projections of future
technologies appear reasonable. Yet the
reader would be more assured of the author’s conclusions if his technical evaluations did not rely so heavily upon articles
in newspapers and popular periodicals.
One can be justifiably skeptical that information drawn from Army Times, Defense
News, or even Aviation Week & Space
Technology fully reflects the broad range
of scientific research and development
throughout government, industry, and academia, both in the United States and
abroad. Likewise, O’Hanlon’s general dismissal of the future military challenges
posed by China, Russia, and North Korea
is somewhat cavalier. It would have been
useful had O’Hanlon made clear his personal qualifications to provide an authoritative evaluation of such a wide range of
technology projections and foreign military
developments. He states that he presented
his findings to “a number of weapons scientists and technology experts,” but he
does not identify them or indicate
whether they agreed with his conclusions.
O’Hanlon uses his projections of future
technology as the basis for a modernization strategy that is intended to promote
“defense innovation” without increasing
the defense budget. He proposes major
reductions, up to two-thirds in such “expensive next generation platforms” as the
F-22 and F/A-18E/F, in order to fund improvements to existing systems and a
broad range of initiatives in research, development, and experimentation. However, most of his recommendations tend
to be as vague as the assumptions he is
challenging. For instance, O’Hanlon approves of the acquisition of “new fleets
of unmanned aerial vehicles,” because it
“appear[s] generally sensible.” He states
that up to two billion dollars a year might
be needed to outfit combat units with
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“internet capabilities” but does not make
clear whether he is referring to the commercial Internet, classified information
networks, or some other type of equipment-interoperability initiative. Likewise,
he makes a broad plea for the military to
“avoid service parochialism and foster
jointness” but does not elaborate on how
best to balance the advantages of organizational unity (as distinguished from systems
interoperability) against the important contribution of interservice competition to the
process of military innovation.
O’Hanlon’s basic thesis is certainly valid.
As he points out, the fact that none of the
military services has actually committed
to major changes in its force structures,
operational concepts, or organizations is
evidence in itself that proponents of innovation have yet to articulate a compelling argument for a very different U.S.
military. This book is far from the final
word on military technology and transformation, but it may serve to stimulate
the proponents of major change to engage in a more detailed debate.
JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS

Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Moskos, Charles C., John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal, eds. The Postmodern Military: Armed
Forces after the Cold War. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2000. 286pp. $45

Ask a soldier or military analyst to describe the “postmodern military,” and
you are likely to get an answer that includes
high technology, precision weapons, information operations, and possibly (especially if he or she is associated with the
Navy) network-centric warfare. Much of
the recent literature on military affairs
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